Of all the different types of civil war, disputes over
self-determination are the most likely to escalate into war and
resist compromise settlement. Reputation and Civil War argues that
this low rate of negotiation is the result of reputation building,
in which governments refuse to negotiate with early challengers in
order to discourage others from making more costly demands in the
future. Jakarta's wars against East Timor and Aceh, for example,
were not designed to maintain sovereignty but to signal to
Indonesia's other minorities that secession would be costly.
Employing data from three different sources - laboratory
experiments on undergraduates, statistical analysis of data on
self-determination movements, and qualitative analyses of recent
history in Indonesia and the Philippines - Barbara F. Walter
provides some of the first systematic evidence that reputation
strongly influences behavior, particularly between governments and
ethnic minorities fighting over territory.
Cambridge University Press (Virtual Publishing)
|Country of origin:
Barbara F. Walter
||Electronic book text
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