This historic book may have numerous typos and missing text. Purchasers can download a free scanned copy of the original book (without typos) from the publisher. Not indexed. Not illustrated. 1871. Excerpt: ... mained, however mortifying it might be to our Cabinet, but to recall the whole army, that which was destined for Walcheren excepted, to England. Every reason--military, political, and medical--militates against our retention of that dear-bought island for many months, when will close the worst-judged and most expensive expedition which our country ever detached--an expedition which consisted of nearly 100,000 fighting men, seamen and soldiers included, and which no military man of experience whom I met with during the short campaign (if worthy of being so called) had a good opinion of ab origins. It was founded on false principles for land operations, and was the child of naval projectors rather than of military sound heads, whose opinions ought decidedly to lead upon the formation of all projects where military men are to be the principal actors. That our Government was ignorant of the channel between Flushing and Cadsand, and of the necessity of all ships passing within gunshot of the former, consequently that the capture of Cadsand could not be of avail--that they were ignorant of the nature of the defence of the town of Antwerp--and, more particularly, that they were ignorant that the dockyard of Antwerp, with the mass of menof-war, was at the south end of that town, and immediately commanded by the citadel, a citadel the capture of which I almost venture to assert that we were unequal to overcome under any circumstances, --are facts so true, by all accounts, and so singularly descriptive of bad judgment, that it does not appear to be too presumptuous for any military man to assert that, according to the plan of government, the expedition neither could nor would have succeeded at any time. That Lord Chatham acted indolently every one knew would happen...