Freedom of the Will provides a novel interpretation of G. E.
Moore's famous conditional analysis of free will and discusses
several questions about the meaning of free will and its
significance for moral responsibility. Although Moore' theory has a
strong initial appeal, most metaphysicians believe that there are
conclusive arguments against it. Huoranszki argues that the
importance of conditional analysis must be reevaluated in light of
some recent developments in the theory of dispositions. The
original analysis can be amended so that the revised conditional
account is not only a good response to determinist worries about
the possibility of free will, but it can also explain the sense in
which free will is an important condition of moral responsibility.
This study addresses three fundamental issues about free will as a
metaphysical condition of responsibility. First, the book explains
why agents are responsible for their actions or omissions only if
they have the ability to do otherwise and shows that the relevant
ability is best captured by the revised conditional analysis.
Second, it aims to clarify the relation between agents' free will
and their rational capacities. It argues that free will as a
condition of responsibility must be understood in terms of agents'
ability to do otherwise rather than in terms of their capacity to
respond to reasons. Finally, the book explains in which sense
responsibility requires self-determination and argues that it is
compatible with agents' limited capacity to control their own
character, reasons, and motives.
|Country of origin:
||Routledge Studies in Metaphysics
||Electronic book text
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