Contributions to Mental Philosophy (Paperback)

This historic book may have numerous typos and missing text. Purchasers can download a free scanned copy of the original book (without typos) from the publisher. Not indexed. Not illustrated. 1860 Excerpt: ...of that inward vision, which we have designated as an intensified dreaming, the sense-perceptions are closed, and the control of the will over the body in general quite suspended. On the other hand, as soon as the senseapparatus gains its rights and begins to react upon the consciousness, the vision-state, just analogously with dreaming, instantly passes away. This fact induces the conclusion, that a different relation of the soul to its own organism must lie at the foundation of these two opposed states of consciousness. If, therefore, in the ordinary or normal state we cannot doubt but that there is an inward and constant connexion kept up between the two, yet we are, on the other hand, necessitated, in the case of those conditions of consciousness which seem to be inaccessible to every sensa-i tional perception or action, to admit the suspension of these conditions, and to consider the bond between the soul and the organism to be at least relaxed. This conclusion, taken in connexion with the other doctrines of our philosophy, is not to be regarded as one of those which merely presents itself for friendly consideration; it can claim almost a demonstrative power, so long as this general law of thought maintains its place--that causes must be analogous to their effects. The fact, that it does not contradict so much as extend and complete the doctrines which have been hitherto entertained, does not detract at all from its importance. All newly discovered truths have at first the lot of struggling against the old, but in the end they are always victorious. Here, however, another weighty question arises, viz. in which of these two opposed states the soul appears most in accordance with its own nature and constitution. Of course, we can have ho doubt but that t...