A Theory of Efficient Cooperation and Competition (Paperback, Revised)


This book looks at competition in a new way. It attacks the notion that competition always leads to good results and that more competition is better. It also attacks the notion that cooperation is always harmful. An efficient economic equilibrium requires an optimal combination of both cooperation and rivalry. Telser first examines the genesis of certain late nineteenth-century laws that affected competition in the United States. Going on to give new theoretical insights into cooperation and rivalry, he shows when unrestricted competition can lead to an efficient equilibrium, as well as when restrictions on competition can provide for the same. The tensions between these two forces are especially pertinent to the study of innovation--the more costly it is to protect the property rights of ideas, the greater is the reliance on secrecy, and hence, the more likely is the wasteful duplication of results.

R1,049

Or split into 4x interest-free payments of 25% on orders over R50
Learn more

Discovery Miles10490
Mobicred@R98pm x 12* Mobicred Info
Free Delivery
Delivery AdviceShips in 10 - 15 working days


Toggle WishListAdd to wish list
Review this Item

Product Description

This book looks at competition in a new way. It attacks the notion that competition always leads to good results and that more competition is better. It also attacks the notion that cooperation is always harmful. An efficient economic equilibrium requires an optimal combination of both cooperation and rivalry. Telser first examines the genesis of certain late nineteenth-century laws that affected competition in the United States. Going on to give new theoretical insights into cooperation and rivalry, he shows when unrestricted competition can lead to an efficient equilibrium, as well as when restrictions on competition can provide for the same. The tensions between these two forces are especially pertinent to the study of innovation--the more costly it is to protect the property rights of ideas, the greater is the reliance on secrecy, and hence, the more likely is the wasteful duplication of results.

Customer Reviews

No reviews or ratings yet - be the first to create one!

Product Details

General

Imprint

Cambridge UniversityPress

Country of origin

United Kingdom

Release date

November 2005

Availability

Expected to ship within 10 - 15 working days

First published

1987

Authors

Dimensions

229 x 153 x 19mm (L x W x T)

Format

Paperback - Trade

Pages

320

Edition

Revised

ISBN-13

978-0-521-02220-0

Barcode

9780521022200

Categories

LSN

0-521-02220-7



Trending On Loot