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Essays on Theory of Information. (Paperback) Loot Price: R1,367
Discovery Miles 13 670
Essays on Theory of Information. (Paperback): Maxim Ivanov
Essays on Theory of Information. (Paperback): Maxim Ivanov

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Essays on Theory of Information. (Paperback)

Maxim Ivanov

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Loot Price R1,367 Discovery Miles 13 670 | Repayment Terms: R127 pm x 12*

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Chapter 1: Informational control and organizational design. This essay focuses on organizational issues of allocating authority between an uninformed principal and an informed expert. We show that the established result of Dessein (2002) that delegating decisions to a perfectly informed expert is generally better than communication is reversed if the principal can restrict the precision of the expert's information (without learning its content). We demonstrate that these organizational forms---informational control and delegation---can be either complements or substitutes, depending on the principal's ability to affect the expert's discretion about the set of allowed policies. Chapter 2: Dynamic information revelation in cheap talk. This essay investigates a multi-stage version of Crawford and Sobel's (1982) communication game in which the principal can affect the quality of the expert's private information at each stage (without learning its content). We construct a mechanism of dynamic updating of expert's information, which refines the expert's information step-by-step, preserving truth-telling communication at every stage. This allows the principal to reveal approximately full information in a large sub-interval of the state space. As a result, the payoff efficiency in multi-stage communication relative to one-stage communication and other organizational forms rises without a bound as the bias in preferences falls. Chapter 3. Information revelation in competitive markets. This essay analyzes a market with multiple sellers and differentiated products. We investigate the sellers' incentives to reveal product relevant information that affects the buyer's private valuations. The main finding is that when the number of sellers reaches some critical (but finite) number, this results in the unique symmetric equilibrium with full disclosure of information by all sellers. Thus, unlike the results by Lewis and Sappington (1994) and Johnson and Myatt (2006) for monopoly, which state that the monopolist reveals either full information or no information, competition refines the seller's dichotomic decisions to a single extreme only. Also, we show that the market efficiency is always bounded away from full efficiency, but the magnitude of inefficiency converges to zero at a high rate as competition intensifies.


Imprint: Proquest, Umi Dissertation Publishing
Country of origin: United States
Release date: September 2011
First published: September 2011
Authors: Maxim Ivanov
Dimensions: 254 x 203 x 8mm (L x W x T)
Format: Paperback - Trade
Pages: 124
ISBN-13: 978-1-243-56554-9
Barcode: 9781243565549
Categories: Promotions
Books > Business & Economics > Economics
Books > Business & Economics > Economics > General
LSN: 1-243-56554-3

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