This historic book may have numerous typos and missing text. Purchasers can download a free scanned copy of the original book (without typos) from the publisher. Not indexed. Not illustrated.1874 Excerpt: ... I Opinion of the Court, per Fobteb, J. v. Nickerson, 13 Mass., 131, 137.) Seven days. (Thurston v. McKenn, 6 Mass, 428.) And even a month (Ranger v. Gary, 1 Mete., 369), is not too long. While eight months American Sank v. Jenness (2 Mete., 288); Ayers v. Hutchins (i Mass., 370), three months and a half. (Stevens v. Bi ice, 21 Pick., 193.) And even two months and a half. (Losee v. Durkin, 7 J. R., 70); and Sice v. Cunningham (1 Cowen, 397, 404), have been deemed sufficient to discredit a note. The statute of limitations commences to run from the date of a note payable on demand, whether without interest. (Newman v. Kettelle, 13 Pick., 418; Larson v. Lambert, 7 Halst., 247; Kingsbury v. Butler, 4 Verm. Rep., 458), or whether it be with interest. (Mason v. Mohawk Ins. Co., 13 Wend., 267.) Cowen, J., in Wethey v. Andrews, and the chief judge, in Merrit v. Todd, appeared to suppose that in regard to the time when demand notes became due, there was a difference in England between those payable with interest, and those on demand merely. And yet I think it will be found that no such distinction prevails there. Formerly, notes on demand, were held to bo due immediately. (Copj) v. Doncaster Cro. Eliz., 548.) Where it was contended that the said demand was parcel of the contract, so that the money was not due until demand, and that a demand by bringing the action would not do, but the court said, the duty of payment was "a duty maintained, and, therefore, these need no demand, as in other cases." (Remhall v. Boyle, 10 Modern Rep., 38.) Where in an action upon a note payable on demand, it was moved in arrest of judgment that no demand was alleged in the declaration; but the court held it to be a debt inprexenti, and that it wa a debt plainly precedent to any demand. C...