This historic book may have numerous typos and missing text. Purchasers can download a free scanned copy of the original book (without typos) from the publisher. Not indexed. Not illustrated. 1900 Excerpt: ... ex vi termini, would be included the dentist's work or a suicidal purpose. Of course, the deceased must have, in a certain sense, inhaled gas; but, in view of the finding that death was caused by accidental means, the proper meaning of the words compels, as does the logic of the thing, the conclusion that there was not that voluntary or conscious act, necessarily involved in the process of inhaling. An accident is the happening of an event without the aid and the design of the person, and which is unforeseen. To inhale gas requires an act of volition on the person's part before the danger is incurred. Poison may be taken by mistake, or poisonous substances may be inadvertently touched; but, whatever the motive of the insured, his act precedes either fact. If the policy had said that it was not to extend to any death caused wholly or in part by gas, it would have expressed precisely what the appellant now says is meant by the present phrase, and there could have been no room for doubt or mistake. Policies of insurance are to be liberally construed, and, as in all contracts, conditions are to be construed strictly against those for whose benefit they are reserved." The principles, so well stated and enforced in the cases above cited, were afterwards approvingly considered in Bacon v. Association, 123 N. Y. 304. In further support of the same principles, reference might be made to other authorities, among which are: May on Insurance, 631, in which reference is made to Trew v. Assurance Co., 6 H. & N. 839; Winspear v. Insurance Co., 6 Q. B. D. 42 (29 Eng. R. 488); Insurance Co. v. Crandal, 120 U. S. 532; Mallory v. Insurance Co., 47 N. Y. 52; North American Ins. Co. v. Burroughs, 69 Pa. 43; McGlinchey v. Casualty Co., 80 Me. 251; Eggenberger v. Associ...