Spinoza's Short Treatise on God, Man, and Human Welfare (Paperback)

This historic book may have numerous typos, missing text or index. Purchasers can download a free scanned copy of the original book (without typos) from the publisher. 1909. Not illustrated. Excerpt: ... CHAPTER II WHAT GOD IS After we have proved as above that there is a God it is now time to demonstrate what he is; that is, we would say that he is a being to whom all, or an infinite number of attributes are ascribed,1 of which attributes each in its way is infinitely perfect.2 In order to express our meaning clearly we shall make the four following statements: (i) That there is no such thing as limited substance,3 but that all substance must be infinitely 1 The reason is that since Nothing can have no attributes, the All must have all attributes; and so since nothing has not any attributes because it is nothing, the Something has attributes because it is something. Therefore the greater the something is, the more attributes it must have, and consequently God who is the most perfect, the infinite, the Everything, must have infinite and perfect attributes and every attribute. 2 In Eth. I, def. vi, God is defined as "Substantiam constantem infinitis attributis, quorum unumquodque aeternam et infinitam essentiam exprimit," "a substance consisting of infinite attributes, each one of which expresses eternal and infinite essence."--Tr. 3 Being able then to show that there can be no limited substance, all substance must be unlimited and belong to the divine essence. This we prove as follows: (1) Either it must have limited itself or another must have limited perfect after its kind; that is to say, that in the infinite understanding of God no substance can be more perfect than it already is by nature. (2) That there are no two substances alike. (3) That one substance can not produce another. (4) That in the infinite understanding of God it. It has not limited itself for as it is unlimited it would have to change its own nature. Neither is it limited by another, for thi...