Future's Back: Nuclear Rivalry, Deterrence Theory, and Crisis Stability After the Cold War (Electronic book text)


Arguing that previous critiques of rational choice and deterrence theory are not convincing, Frank Harvey constructs a new set of empirical tests of rational deterrence theory to illuminate patterns of interaction between rival nuclear powers. He analyses the crisis management techniques used by the United States and the Soviet Union in twenty-eight post-war crises and isolates factors that promote or inhibit escalation of these crises. This crises-based data set serves as the basis for identifying patterns of response when one nuclear state is threatened by another.

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Product Description

Arguing that previous critiques of rational choice and deterrence theory are not convincing, Frank Harvey constructs a new set of empirical tests of rational deterrence theory to illuminate patterns of interaction between rival nuclear powers. He analyses the crisis management techniques used by the United States and the Soviet Union in twenty-eight post-war crises and isolates factors that promote or inhibit escalation of these crises. This crises-based data set serves as the basis for identifying patterns of response when one nuclear state is threatened by another.

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Product Details

General

Imprint

McGill-Queen's University Press

Country of origin

United States

Release date

1994

Availability

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Authors

Format

Electronic book text

Pages

208

ISBN-13

978-1-282-85446-8

Barcode

9781282854468

Categories

LSN

1-282-85446-1



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