After World War II, the United States felt secure in its atomic
monopoly. With the American ""Pax Atomica"" in place, the free
world held an apparent strategic advantage over the Soviet bloc and
saw itself as a bulwark against communist expansion. But America's
atomic superiority in the early postwar years was more fiction than
fact. From 1945 until 1950, the U.S. atomic arsenal was poorly
coordinated, equipped and funded. The newly formed Atomic Energy
Commission inherited from the Manhattan Engineer District a program
suffering from poor organization, failing infrastructure and
internal conflict. The military establishment and the Air Force's
Strategic Air Command little knew what to do with this new weapon.
The Air Force and the AEC failed to coordinate their efforts for a
possible atomic air offensive and war plans were ill-conceived,
reflecting unrealistic expectations of Air Force capabilities and
possible political outcomes. This lack of preparedness serves as a
case study in the tenuous nature of American civilian-military
Is the information for this product incomplete, wrong or inappropriate?
Let us know about it.
Does this product have an incorrect or missing image?
Send us a new image.
Is this product missing categories?
Add more categories.
Review This Product
No reviews yet - be the first to create one!