Purchase of this book includes free trial access to www.million-books.com where you can read more than a million books for free. This is an OCR edition with typos. Excerpt from book: running back to the stable wall mentioned in the deed, and shown in the diagram. In 1827, the administrator of John Litle conveyed to Sharp, the defendant, all the lot conveyed by Morris to Litle, except the lot conveyed by the latter to Smock, as above mentioned. This deed conveyed the premises, subject to the right of way mentioned in the deed, to Smock, above referred to, and " to all the covenants made by the said John Litle to the said Robert Smock." Since October, 1828, the defendant has passed on foot and led a horse, without the leave of the plaintiff, through the four-and-a-half foot alley, and on through a continuation thereof, indicated on the diagram by a dotted line, to and through the stable wall, through which he made an opening into the stable. The question submitted to the court is, whether, in point of law, the defendant has, by reason of the premises, interfered with or obstructed the said alley, or the use or enjoyment thereof, by the plaintiff, as he was entitled to use and enjoy the same. Gadwalader and Ghauncey, for the plaintiff. Read and Bouvier, for the defendant. By Court, Gibson G. J. The sum of the few authorities which bear on the point before us, is given in Cruise's Digest, tit. 24, sec. 15, where it is said that the use of a way must be according to the grant or the occasion of it, and not exceed it: Bo that a right of way over another's ground to a particular place will not justify the use of it to go beyond that place. For this is cited Bowel v. King, 1 Mod. 190, and Lawton v. Ward, 1 Ld. Baym. 75, which bear a considerable resemblance to the present case. In the former of them, A., having a right of way over B.'s ground to Blackacre, drove his cattle not only to Blackacre, but to a place beyond it; and it was argued, that when they were a...