This historic book may have numerous typos and missing text. Purchasers can download a free scanned copy of the original book (without typos) from the publisher. Not indexed. Not illustrated. 1905 Excerpt: ...in this case, is continuing its retreat. To attempt to carry New Bridge and Stoke Bridge by a direct attack against an enemy only slightly inferior in numbers, appears not only to be doing exactly what he would wish one to do, but to be running one's head against a brick wall. From Borton to Tilford my march will be concealed by high ground; with 2 squadrons on each flank I should be able to drive his cavalry in, and prevent them obtaining much information. On the other hand the hostile squadrons will probably fall back on some convenient point of appui which they will hold with dismounted fire; and it will be impossible for my cavalry unaided by infantry to dislodge them, unless they can threaten their line of retreat. However, from Frimley, as far as can be seen from the map, the enemy's line of retreat appears to run NNE., and the Tilford flank not only seems tactically the best, but by far the best strategically, as if I can only induce him to remain in position long enough, and can gain the ground north of the Park, I shall be on a shorter line to Frimley and the road to London than he is, and therefore seriously threaten his line of retreat. The movement, therefore, takes place as follows: --Two squadrons, 1st Hussars, remain in observation on Long Hill, having driven in the hostile squadron on that flank to a position near "The Firs." The 2 guns R.H.A. advance to the 2 squadrons, and come into action enfilading to a great extent the position. No. 2 battalion and the company R.E. advance via Larry to the northern edge of Maharambout Wood. All the above force is under the command of Colonel C. D., commanding 1st Hussars, with orders to induce the enemy to think that this is the real attack. I, meanwhile, advance with 1 troop and 4 guns and par...