Stochastically Stable Equilibrium (Paperback)


High Quality Content by WIKIPEDIA articles! In game theory, a stochastically stable equilibrium is a refinement of the evolutionarily stable state in evolutionary game theory, proposed by Dean Foster and Peyton Young. An evolutionary stable state S is also stochastically stable if under vanishing noise the probability that the population is in the vicinity of state S does not go to zero. The concept is extensively used in models of learning in populations, where "noise" is used to model experimentation or replacement of unsuccessful players with new players (random mutation). Over time, as the need for experimentation dies down or the population becomes stable, the population will converge towards a subset of evolutionarily stable states. Foster and Young have shown that this subset is the set of states with the highest potential.

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Product Description

High Quality Content by WIKIPEDIA articles! In game theory, a stochastically stable equilibrium is a refinement of the evolutionarily stable state in evolutionary game theory, proposed by Dean Foster and Peyton Young. An evolutionary stable state S is also stochastically stable if under vanishing noise the probability that the population is in the vicinity of state S does not go to zero. The concept is extensively used in models of learning in populations, where "noise" is used to model experimentation or replacement of unsuccessful players with new players (random mutation). Over time, as the need for experimentation dies down or the population becomes stable, the population will converge towards a subset of evolutionarily stable states. Foster and Young have shown that this subset is the set of states with the highest potential.

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Product Details

General

Imprint

Betascript Publishing

Country of origin

United States

Release date

August 2010

Availability

Supplier out of stock. If you add this item to your wish list we will let you know when it becomes available.

First published

August 2010

Editors

, ,

Dimensions

152 x 229 x 5mm (L x W x T)

Format

Paperback - Trade

Pages

76

ISBN-13

978-6131252792

Barcode

9786131252792

Categories

LSN

6131252793



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