Preconceptions, Predilections, and Experience - Problems for Operational Level Intelligence and Decisionmaking (Paperback)


This study examines intelligence at the operational level of war. Current U.S. Army intelligence doctrine fails to recognize an operational level intelligence function separate and distinct from tactical or strategic intelligence functions. Neither does it identify the characteristics of intelligence at the operational level. Doctrine states that intelligence at the operational level of war is merely the "fusion" of tactical and strategic intelligence. This monograph posits that the fusion of tactical and strategic intelligence is inadequate for the operational commander and that the very proposition reflects a serious void in military thinking. This study looks at several military actions at the operational level, outlines the peculiar characteristics of intelligence associated with those actions and suggests a number of considerations for those who deal with intelligence at the operational level of war. Among the conclusions to be drawn from this paper are: the U.S. Army lacks a refined operational intelligence perspective, the operational art demands that an operational intelligence perspective be thoroughly developed and examined for its doctrinal implications, and doctrine needs to be reexamined and rewritten to describe adequately the characteristics and functions of intelligence at the operational level of war. This operational intelligence perspective then needs to be promulgated to commanders and intelligence officers at all level of the military and throughout the intelligence community.

R1,368

Or split into 4x interest-free payments of 25% on orders over R50
Learn more

Discovery Miles13680
Mobicred@R128pm x 12* Mobicred Info
Free Delivery
Delivery AdviceShips in 10 - 15 working days


Toggle WishListAdd to wish list
Review this Item

Product Description

This study examines intelligence at the operational level of war. Current U.S. Army intelligence doctrine fails to recognize an operational level intelligence function separate and distinct from tactical or strategic intelligence functions. Neither does it identify the characteristics of intelligence at the operational level. Doctrine states that intelligence at the operational level of war is merely the "fusion" of tactical and strategic intelligence. This monograph posits that the fusion of tactical and strategic intelligence is inadequate for the operational commander and that the very proposition reflects a serious void in military thinking. This study looks at several military actions at the operational level, outlines the peculiar characteristics of intelligence associated with those actions and suggests a number of considerations for those who deal with intelligence at the operational level of war. Among the conclusions to be drawn from this paper are: the U.S. Army lacks a refined operational intelligence perspective, the operational art demands that an operational intelligence perspective be thoroughly developed and examined for its doctrinal implications, and doctrine needs to be reexamined and rewritten to describe adequately the characteristics and functions of intelligence at the operational level of war. This operational intelligence perspective then needs to be promulgated to commanders and intelligence officers at all level of the military and throughout the intelligence community.

Customer Reviews

No reviews or ratings yet - be the first to create one!

Product Details

General

Imprint

Biblioscholar

Country of origin

United States

Release date

November 2012

Availability

Expected to ship within 10 - 15 working days

First published

November 2012

Authors

Dimensions

246 x 189 x 3mm (L x W x T)

Format

Paperback - Trade

Pages

52

ISBN-13

978-1-288-30639-8

Barcode

9781288306398

Categories

LSN

1-288-30639-3



Trending On Loot