Allenby and British Strategy in the Middle East, 1917-1919 (Paperback, annotated edition)

This book is a thought-provoking study of the Palestine campaign fought by the British-led Egyptian Expeditionary Force (EEF) from 1917 to the withdrawal from Syria in 1919. The book also provides a reassessment of General Allenby's role as a forceful and mercurial commander in the events of this period.

Under Allenby's command, the EEF first captured Jerusalem in December 1917, then annihilated the Turkish armies in Palestine at Megiddo in 1918 and proceeded to occupy the whole of the Levant. However, Matthew Hughes points out that these famous military successes mask the realities of the campaign which was poorly organised and executed, and, as a result, did little to defeat the Central Alliance. Prime Minister Lloyd George and his advisers, notably General Robertson, disagreed over the purpose of the Palestine campaign and this further impeded Allenby.

Hughes goes on to show that the occupation of the Middle East by the British was more useful in providing for a peace settlement favourable to the British empire. After installing the pro-Hashemite Arabs in Damascus at the war's end, the British were able to gain France's acceptance for their occupation of Palestine and northern Iraq. However, the British were unable to persuade France to agree to adjustments of the eastern border of Syria for a land route to Palestine from Iraq. Therefore, in 1919, with its imperial needs satisfied and the need to retrench paramount, Britain withdrew from Syria.