This book presents a theoretical framework to discuss how
governments coordinate budgeting decisions. There are two modes of
fiscal governance conducive to greater fiscal discipline, a mode of
delegation and a mode of contracts. These modes contrast with a
fiefdom form of governance, in which the decision-making process is
decentralized. An important insight is that the effectiveness of a
given form of fiscal governance depends crucially upon the
underlying political system. Delegation functions well when there
few, or no, ideological differences among government parties,
whereas contracts are effective when there are many such
differences. Based on original research, the book classifies
European Union countries from 1985 to 2004. Empirically, delegation
and contract states perform better than fiefdom states if they
match the underlying political system. Additional chapters consider
why countries have the fiscal institutions that they do, fiscal
governance in Central and Eastern Europe, and the role of such
institutions in the European Union.
Cambridge University Press (Virtual Publishing)
|Country of origin:
||Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics
• Rolf Rainer Strauch
• Jurgen Von Hagen
||Electronic book text
Social sciences >
Politics & government >
Is the information for this product incomplete, wrong or inappropriate?
Let us know about it.
Does this product have an incorrect or missing image?
Send us a new image.
Is this product missing categories?
Add more categories.
Review This Product
No reviews yet - be the first to create one!