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Collective Decision-Making - Social Choice and Political Economy (Hardcover, 1996) Loot Price: R3,200 Discovery Miles 32 000 You Save: R284 (8%)

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Collective Decision-Making - Social Choice and Political Economy (Hardcover, 1996): Norman Schofield
Collective Decision-Making - Social Choice and Political Economy (Hardcover, 1996): Norman Schofield

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Collective Decision-Making - Social Choice and Political Economy (Hardcover, 1996)

Norman Schofield

Series: Recent Economic Thought, v. 50

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List price R3,484 Loot Price R3,200 Discovery Miles 32 000 You Save R284 (8%)

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In the last decade the techniques of social choice theory, game theory and positive political theory have been combined in interesting ways so as to pro- vide a common framework for analyzing the behavior of a developed political economy. Social choice theory itself grew out of the innovative attempts by Ken- neth Arrow (1951) and Duncan Black (1948, 1958) to extend the range of economic theory in order to deal with collective decision-making over public goods. Later work, by William Baumol (1952), and James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock (1962), focussed on providing an "economic" interpretation of democratic institutions. In the same period Anthony Downs (1957) sought to model representative democracy and elections while William Riker (1962) made use of work in cooperative game theory (by John von Neumann and Oscar Morgenstern, 1944) to study coalition behavior. In my view, these "rational choice" analyses of collective decision-making have their antecedents in the arguments of Adam Smith (1759, 1776), James Madison (1787) and the Marquis de Condorcet (1785) about the "design" of political institutions. In the introductory chapter to this volume I briefly describe how some of the current normative and positive aspects of social choice date back to these earlier writers.

General

Imprint: Kluwer Academic Publishers
Country of origin: United States
Series: Recent Economic Thought, v. 50
Release date: September 1996
First published: September 1996
Editors: Norman Schofield
Dimensions: 234 x 156 x 25mm (L x W x T)
Format: Hardcover - Laminated cover
Pages: 443
Edition: 1996
ISBN-13: 978-0-7923-9711-3
Barcode: 9780792397113
Categories: Books > Social sciences > Politics & government
Books > Social sciences > Politics & government > General
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Books > Social sciences > Psychology > Social, group or collective psychology
LSN: 0-7923-9711-8

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