Proclus' Metaphysical Elements-- (Paperback)

This historic book may have numerous typos and missing text. Purchasers can usually download a free scanned copy of the original book (without typos) from the publisher. Not indexed. Not illustrated. 1909 edition. Excerpt: ...that which is First is alone entirely unknown, because it is imparticipable. For all knowledge which arises through reasoning deals with beings, and in beings possesses the apprehension of truth, since it comes into contact with conceptions, and subsists in intellections. But the Gods are beyond all beings. Neither, therefore, is that which is divine the object of opinion, nor can it be apprehended by the dianoetic power, or by intellection. For every being is either sensible, and therefore the object of opinion; or truly existing being, and therefore the object of intellect, or it is between these, existing as being and at the same time as generated, and therefore the object of the dianoetic power (discursive reason). If, therefore, the Gods are superessential, and subsist prior to beings, they cannot be apprehended by either opinion, or by science and discursive reason, or by intelligence. But the nature of their peculiarities is known by the beings which depend on them: and this by a necessary consequence. For the differences of participants are co-divided conformably to the peculiarities of the participated natures. And neither does every thing participate of every thing: for there is no coordination of things perfectly dissimilar. Nor does any casual thing participate of that which is casual. But that which is kindred is conjoined to that which is kindred, and proceeds from that to which it is allied. PROPOSITION CXXIV. Every God knows partible natures impartibly, temporal natures without time, things which are notnecessary necessarily, mutable natures immutably; and, summarily, all things in a manner more excellent than the order of things lcnown. For if every thing which is with the Gods is with them according to their...