This historic book may have numerous typos and missing text. Purchasers can usually download a free scanned copy of the original book (without typos) from the publisher. Not indexed. Not illustrated. 1913 edition. Excerpt: ...the parents, letters written by her during such separation, in which she addresses him as her dear husband, are competent to show the condition of her feelings towards him; and the husband is a competent witness to show that such letters are in the handwriting of the wife." It was said the letters when used for such a purpose could not be regarded as a communication within the object and purpose of the statute, and the husband, therefore, did not testify to a communication but simply to a fact--that of the handwriting of his wife. This ruling is supported by Perry v. Lovejoy, 49 Mich. 529, and cases cited in the opinion. In Michigan, Massa 41'I'ay1or's Evidence, sec. 909; 59 Iowa, 179, 13 N. W. 103; Otis v. Spencer, 102 Ill. 622; Hough v. Blythe, 20 Ind. 24. Stein v. Bowman, 13 Pet. 209, 10 48 Holtz v. Dick, 42 Ohio St. 23. L. Ed. 129; Coflin v. Jones, 13 44 Holtz v. Dick, 42 Ohio St. Pick. 441. 23. See also Horner v. Yance, 4'-' Robinson v. Talmadge, 97 93 Wis. 352, 67 N. W. 720. Mass. 171; Hanks v. Van Carder, chusetts, Missouri, Kansas and perhaps some other states, statutes provide that neither the husband nor the wife, during the marriage or afterwards, without the consent of both can be examined as to any communication made by the one to the other during their marriage. Under such statutes by common consent they become competent witnesses, but without such consent the statute leaves the rule as at common law." Communications in presence of third persons. In general, the same rule applies to communications between such persons as we have seen is applied to communications between client and attorney with respect to the secrecy of the communication, with the exception hereinafter stated. Thus, if the communication be...