This historic book may have numerous typos and missing text. Purchasers can download a free scanned copy of the original book (without typos) from the publisher. Not indexed. Not illustrated. 1829 Excerpt: ...but these notions arc obviously not directly under our control. They arise only when the law of association, to which they owe their existence, happens to be in operation. It seemed necessary, therefore, to suppose the existence of a distinct power, which, putting forth its energy under the direction of volition, might secure their presence at all times when there is occasion for them; for that conceptions do arise, one after another, by a mere act of will, seems not to have been doubted by the philosophers to whom reference is now made--an opinion which, I trust, will speedily appear to be altogether unfounded. MEMORY. Nor is it much less manifest that Memory, as well as Conception, may be resolved into Suggestion. Even Mr. Stewart, though he classes Memory among the original powers, admits that the remembrance of a past event is not a simple act of the mind--that we first form a conception of the event, and then judge of the time to which it is to be referred. This statement is indeed extorted from him, to obviate a charge of seeming contradiction in his statements--a contradiction which, 1 cannot avoid thinking, he might have suffered to remain, without materially increasing the obscurity into which his neglect of analysis has plunged him. The reader shall judge for himself: --" Conception implies no idea of time whatever."--" Conception is always attended with a belief that its objects exist;" that is, it implies the idea of present time, like perception. Again; " We have the power, as will not be disputed, of conceiving a past event without any reference to time.'--" Every exertion of the power of conception is accompanied with a belief that its object exists before us at the present moment;"t that is, we have not the ...