This historic book may have numerous typos and missing text. Purchasers can download a free scanned copy of the original book (without typos) from the publisher. Not indexed. Not illustrated. 1850 Excerpt: ... from the enforcement of a legal right, or from failure of security for costs, by reason of the death of a relator or otherwise, I conceive that the Judge may properly suggest to the Attorney-General the propriety of his considering the case, and may properly stay the proceedings to give him sufficient opportunity to do so; but I am not aware, that the Judge has any authority to overrule the decision of the Attorney-General when formed. In this respect he is, I think, subject to another authority; and it appears to me very material not to confound judicial authority, (a) Webster's Patent Cases, 486. 665. The Queen v. Pkosser. 1848. authority, properly so called, with ministerial authority, affected, as it often is, with quasi judicial authority. The Queen v. Prosseb. The Lord Chancellor seems to have intimated in The Queen v. Neilson, that he might have authority, in consequence of the circumstances being altered since the fiat was before the Attorney-General; but what he said (there was no decision on the point) was principally founded on this, that the litigation was, in fact, proceeding without any legal object: it was vexatious; and in that respect, I apprehend, that if the AttorneyGeneral thought fit to persevere, it might be within the jurisdiction and' authority of the Lord Chancellor to stop such proceedings. What seems to me remarkable in the case of The Queen v. Neilson is, that the Attorney-General, who might have stayed the proceedings or entered a nolle prosequi by his own authority, was present in Court, and made no offer to stay what was alleged, if not admitted, to be a vexatious proceeding, but rather seems to have asserted the propriety of an interference by the Lord Chancellor. With all the respect which is due to what was then done, I ow...