Philosophy of Criminal Law (Paperback)

This historic book may have numerous typos and missing text. Purchasers can download a free scanned copy of the original book (without typos) from the publisher. Not indexed. Not illustrated. 1880 Excerpt: ... 317-822; State t. Smith, 32 Me. 369. In R. v. Hewlett, 1 F. & F. 91, the defendant was indicted for wounding A. with intent to do him bodily harm. The evidence showed that the defendant, intending to wound B., unintentionally wounded A. This was held a fatal variance. S. P., Com. v. Morgan, 11 Bush, 601; Barcus v. State, 49 Miss. 17; Morgan v. State, 13 Sm. & M. 242. See, however, comments in R. v. Stopford, 11 Cox C. C. 643. These cases are noticed supra, 107; infra, 645 a. See infra, 317-18. The controversy as to error in objecto, and as to aberratio ictus, as it is called, relates to the effect and not to the character of malice. As to this controversy, Meyer (Lehrbuch, 1875, 30), makes the following observations: --(1.) Where the actor errs in the execution of the act, and hurts a person other than he intended (error in persona), the true view is that the mistake is no defence. The actor is responsible, even when he had no desire to injure the person hurt, and would never have attacked such person. It is enough, to impute the crime to him, that he intentionally attacked an object under the protection of the law, effected his particular purpose. The opposite view, which in such cases holds the error to be essential, determining the defendant to be guilty of a negligent offence as to the injured party, and of an attempt as to the non-injured party, fails from its mistaking the period in which the offence took shape. That period is the time immediately before the commission of the act; and when in this period the actor willed to injure the object before him, and did injure that object, this completes the offence; and the error he was in as to the identity of the object is as immaterial as error as to an...