Shaping the Plan for Operation Iraqi Freedom - The Role of Military Intelligence Assessments (Paperback, Revised ed.)


The aftermath of the war in Iraq has generated a great deal of second-guessing regarding Washington's prewar planning and intelligence efforts. Largely missing from this debate has been a thorough examination of the role of military intelligence efforts outside Washington. Gregory Hooker, senior intelligence analyst for Iraq at U.S. Central Command, provides a detailed narrative of the war planning process, beginning with the military's initial attempts to adjust to the new focus on regime change and closing with the government's ineffective preparation for the postwar environment. Alongside this narrative, he offers a sober assessment of the accuracy of specific prewar intelligence estimates. Throughout, he details the many challenges that military planners had to overcome, including inconsistent security measures aimed at keeping the war plan secret, unrealistic ideas adopted at times by policy advocates in Washington, and unnecessary time constraints on planning caused by competing assumptions between senior policymakers and CENTCOM.

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Product Description

The aftermath of the war in Iraq has generated a great deal of second-guessing regarding Washington's prewar planning and intelligence efforts. Largely missing from this debate has been a thorough examination of the role of military intelligence efforts outside Washington. Gregory Hooker, senior intelligence analyst for Iraq at U.S. Central Command, provides a detailed narrative of the war planning process, beginning with the military's initial attempts to adjust to the new focus on regime change and closing with the government's ineffective preparation for the postwar environment. Alongside this narrative, he offers a sober assessment of the accuracy of specific prewar intelligence estimates. Throughout, he details the many challenges that military planners had to overcome, including inconsistent security measures aimed at keeping the war plan secret, unrealistic ideas adopted at times by policy advocates in Washington, and unnecessary time constraints on planning caused by competing assumptions between senior policymakers and CENTCOM.

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Product Details

General

Imprint

The Washington Institute For Near East Policy

Country of origin

United States

Release date

April 2005

Availability

Supplier out of stock. If you add this item to your wish list we will let you know when it becomes available.

First published

May 2005

Authors

Dimensions

215 x 139 x 9mm (L x W x T)

Format

Paperback

Pages

114

Edition

Revised ed.

ISBN-13

978-0-944029-98-5

Barcode

9780944029985

Categories

LSN

0-944029-98-1



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