1815, Waterloo (Paperback)

This historic book may have numerous typos, missing text or index. Purchasers can download a free scanned copy of the original book (without typos) from the publisher. 1900. Not illustrated. Excerpt: ... BOOK III CHAPTER VIII THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 I. The operations of the 15th of June--The battles of Ligny and of Quatre Bras. II. Napoleon's mistake. III. Marshal Grouchy. IV. Waterloo. Section I The original plan of the campaign of 1815, and even the movements which were its development, rank amongst the finest strategical conceptions of Napoleon. Everything failed owing to defects of execution, some of which may be attributed to the Emperor, a far larger number to his lieutenants. The very first day, Drouet d'Erlon started marching an hour and a half behind the time appointed; Gerard interpreted the instructions of the Emperor to suit his own convenience; Vandamme broke up his camps three hours after the hour fixed, halted his troops before the end of the fight, and refused to co-operate with Grouchy; Ney suddenly became cautious even to timidity, and did not dare to carry out the manoeuvre with which he was charged. The service of the staff was badly performed, the transmission of orders was slow and uncertain. The chiefs were hesitating and apathetic, without zeal, without initiative, without spirit. They seemed to have lost all faith in the Napoleonic star; they only appeared to wish to advance with measured steps beyond the frontier, as if they felt the grip of the enemy's two great hosts already upon them. The all-powerful engine of war, constructed by Napoleon, was apparently worn out, or overstrained. Thus the day of the 15th of June, did not produce the results which might have been anticipated. Had the army marched as the Emperor's orders directed, before twelve o'clock all the troops would have crossed the Sambre; by three o'clock, the Prussians under Pirch II. would have been dislodged from Gilly; in the evening, Grouchy would have occupied Sombreffe, ...