In his book, philosopher and law professor Ken Levy explains why he
agrees with most people, but not with most other philosophers,
about free will and responsibility. Most people believe that we
have both - that is, that our choices, decisions, and actions are
neither determined nor undetermined but rather fully
self-determined. By contrast, most philosophers understand just how
difficult it is to defend this "metaphysical libertarian" position.
So they tend to opt for two other theories: "responsibility
skepticism" (which denies the very possibility of free will and
responsibility) and "compatibilism" (which reduces free will and
responsibility to properties that are compatible with determinism).
In opposition to both of these theories, Levy explains how free
will and responsibility are indeed metaphysically possible. But he
also cautions against the dogma that metaphysical libertarianism is
actually true, a widespread belief that continues to cause serious
social, political, and legal harms. Levy's book presents a crisp,
tight, historically informed discussion, with fresh clarity,
insight, and originality. It will become one of the definitive
resources for students, academics, and general readers in this
critical intersection among metaphysics, ethics, and criminal law.
Key features: Presents a unique, qualified defense of "metaphysical
libertarianism," the idea that our choices, decisions, and actions
can be fully self-determined. Written clearly, accessibly, and with
minimal jargon - rare for a book on the very difficult issues of
free will and responsibility. Seamlessly connects philosophical,
legal, psychological, and political issues. Will be provocative and
insightful for professional philosophers, students, and
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