Analysis of Rok-Us Military Command Relationship from the Korean War to the Present (Paperback)

The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the evolution of the Korean-American military command relationship from the historical perspective with the object of setting forth a proposal for a new structure based on a consultative relationship, rather than command. The study focuses on the following questions: 1) What factors led to the original structure of the ROK/US/UN command relationship at the time of the Korean War, 2) What changes have altered the requirements of the command structure, and 3) What changes should be made in the ROK/US/UN command structure to make it militarily more efficient and politically more acceptable to the ROK? Analysis reveals that the current politically complex ROK-US military command arrangement is not designed to wage war. The inconsistency between the peacekeeping mission of the UNC and the warfighting task of the CFC seems to pose added problems for the effective combined operations of allies. No single US units is assigned to the operational control (OPCON) of CFC in peacetime, while most combat units of ROK forces are assigned to CFC. The ROK JCS exercises only OPCON ROK units for counter-infiltration operations. The ROK Chief of Staff of each service exercise command less OPCON. A single US senior officer has an overwhelming power. The fact that the US, as a foreign power, speaks for the entire southern side on the Military Armistice Commission while North Korea represents the North constitutes a further embarrassment and political humiliation for the ROK. The ROK Armed Forces has outgrown the ROK-US military relationship created by the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1953.