Reports of Cases Determined by the Supreme Court of the State of Nevada Volume N . 41 (Paperback)

This historic book may have numerous typos and missing text. Purchasers can download a free scanned copy of the original book (without typos) from the publisher. Not indexed. Not illustrated. 1918 Excerpt: ...the Sign of the Bible," and directly charging "is no slouch at swearing falsely." In Riley v. Lee, 88 Ky. 603, 11 S. W. 713, 21 Am. St. Rep. 358, the question was as to a published article setting forth in unmistakable language the direct charge of a false utterance alleged to have been made by the plaintiff. In Sanderson v. Caldwell, 45 N. Y. 398, 6 Am. Rep. 105, there was specific reference to the plaintiff, calling him by name, mentioning acts done in "his sober moments," then charging the collection of "blood money" a "big thing," thus imputing extortionate conduct in his profession. Many other cases of like significance might be referred to as signifying what courts have held to be language libelous per se. None of them are analogous to the case at bar. In each of the cases to which we have last referred, language is used designating a given person with reasonable certainty and terms or assertions are resorted to in the libelous utterance imputing attributes which, with reference to the person, either by reason of the common use made of the term within the locality or the acceptation of the term or assertion generally, would naturally tend to degrade him in the estimation of his fellow men, or hold him out to ridicule or scorn, or would tend to injure him in his business, occupation, or profession. Opinion of the Court--McCarran, C. J. 13. It is contended by appellant that, even though the language used in the letter complained of was not libelous per se, no allegation of special damages was necessary. It is sufficient to say in this respect that all of the authorities to which we have referred, and indeed many others, support the proposition that where the language complained of is not libelous per...