This historic book may have numerous typos, missing text or index. Purchasers can download a free scanned copy of the original book (without typos) from the publisher. 1907. Not illustrated. Excerpt: ... the court below. Unless it is so, the finding of fact made by that court can not be reversed. (I)e la Rama vs. De la Rama, 201 U. S., 303.) The two statements signed by Roa, one in 1892 and the other in 1893, are competent evidence against him. They are admissions by him to the effect that at that time the pueblo was the owner of the property in question. They are, of course, not conclusive against him. He was entitled to, and did present evidence to overcome the effect of these admissions. The evidence does not make out a case of estoppel against him. (Sec. 333, par. 1, Code of Civil Procedure.) The admissibility of these statements made by Roa do not rest upon section 278 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which relates to declarations or admissions made by persons not a party to the suit, but it rests upon the principle that when the defendant in a suit has himself made an admission of any fact pertinent to the issue involved, it can be received against him. This action was commenced on the 17th of December, 1902. There is no evidence of any adverse occupation of this land for thirty years, consequently the extraordinary period of prescription does not apply. The defendant can not rely upon the ordinary period of prescription of ten years because he was not a holder in good faith. He knew at the time of his purchase in 1894, and had so stated in writing, that the pueblo was the owner of the property. So that, even if the statute of limitations ran against a municipality in reference to a public square, it could not avail the defendant in this case. It appears that Roa has constructed upon the property, and that there now stands thereon, a substantial building. As early as 1852 this land had been used by the municipality for other purposes than that of a public s...