Fundamental Philosophy (Paperback)

This historic book may have numerous typos and missing text. Purchasers can download a free scanned copy of the original book (without typos) from the publisher. Not indexed. Not illustrated. 1856 edition. Excerpt: ...them with each other, and with anterior phenomena. Apart, then, from all idea of the external world, and even of all being outside of ourselves, we are certain of the distinction between the two orders of phenomena, those of sleep and those of waking. Therefore, they who attack the certainty of our cognitions because of the difficulty of distinguishing between these states, make use of a very weak argument, and rely upon a fact entirely false. So far am I from believing it impossible to distinguish philosophically between sleep and waking, that I deem the difference between these two states one of the clearest and most certain facts of our nature. Having established this truth, and supposing no one to doubt that the sensations experienced in sleep are not produced by external objects, and that, consequently, they cannot be a means of acquiring truth, I pass to another more difficult and important question. OHAPTBE IV. RELATION OF SENSATIONS TO AN EXTERNAL WORLD. 24. Have our sensations any relation to external objects, or are they merely phenomena of our nature? Can we infer the existence of an external world from the existence of that internal world resulting from the union of the scenes presented by sensations? This question is theoretical, not practical, and depends solely on the force of reasoning, not on the voice of nature, --a voice stronger than all argument, and irresistible. To whatever result the philosophical examination of the relations of the ideal and the real worlds may lead, we must submit to that necessity of our nature which makes us believe in the existence of such relations. The great majority of mankind never have thought, and probably never will think of making such an examination; and yet they have no shadow of doubt that..