This historic book may have numerous typos and missing text. Purchasers can usually download a free scanned copy of the original book (without typos) from the publisher. Not indexed. Not illustrated. 1913 edition. Excerpt: ...and it amounted to a representation that the property was being offered for sale on that footing. In the circumstances such a statement so intended would amount to a promise that no obstruction would be placed in the way of the enjoyment of the street by McCully or his successor in title binding on the vendor within the principle of Piggott V. Stratton, 1 DeG. F. & J. 33, as explained in Spiccr v. Martin, 14 App. Gas. 12, at page 23. The Statute of Frauds would be no obstacle in the circumstances of this case. It was, of course, argued that such a promise ought to have been expressed in the deed. The same argument was presented in P-iggott v. Stratton, 1 DeG. F. & J. 33, and it is dealt with by Lindley, L.J., in Martin V. Spicer, 34 Ch.D. 1, at page 12; see also Heillmt, The case in favour of McCully s successors is still stronger. The effect of the representation conveyed by the conduct of Mrs. Patrick in dealing with the property would be instensified as every year passed by and as Rachel street continued to be used by the occupants of the property in question under the belief that they were rightfully entiltled to the enjoyment of it, and as the property continued to be assessed for taxation purposes upon that assumption. It is argued that there is no evidence shewing Mrs. Patrick to have been aware of this user. That I think is of little, if any, importance in view of the fact that the evidence points so clearly to this user being in accordance with Mrs. Patrick s own intentions. In these circumstances, the appellant is, I think, entitled to rely upon the principle stated in various forms in Caimcross v. Lorimer, 3 L.T. 130, 3 Macq. 829, by Lord Campbell; in Oliver v. King, 8 DeG. M. & G. 110, at 118; in...