Game Theoretic Risk Analysis of Security Threats introduces
reliability and risk analysis in the face of threats by intelligent
agents. More specifically, game-theoretic models are developed for
identifying optimal and/or equilibrium defense and attack
strategies in systems of varying degrees of complexity. The book
covers applications to networks, including problems in both
telecommunications and transportation. However, the book s primary
focus is to integrate game theory and reliability methodologies
into a set of techniques to predict, detect, diminish, and stop
intentional attacks at targets that vary in complexity.
In this book, Bier and Azaiez highlight work by researchers who
combine reliability and risk analysis with game theory methods to
create a set of functional tools that can be used to offset
intentional, intelligent threats (including the threats of
terrorism and war). A comprehensive treatment of such problems must
consider two aspects: (1) the structure of the system to be
protected; and (2) the adaptive nature of the threat). The book
provides a set of tools for applying game theory TO reliability
problems in the presence of intentional, intelligent threats. These
tools will help to address problems of global security and also
facilitate more cost-effective defensive investments.
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